Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Monday, January 16, 2017

Unilateral Conduct and Standards

Daryl Lim, John Marshall discusses Unilateral Conduct and Standards.

ABSTRACT: This chapter examines how antitrust law and patent law have responded to unilateral conduct by patentees in the standards context. A patentee who legitimately wins the market may improperly leverage on its monopoly power to exclude rivals. Similarly, providing the best-in-breed technology cannot excuse patentees who practice patent ambush. Deception corrupts the competitive process by which SSOs select the best-in-breed technology at a competitive price. If patentees seek to leverage on collaborative standardization, they must accept both the benefit and burdens of that process.

 

January 16, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Role of Market Power in Economic Growth: An Analysis of the Differences between EU and US Competition Policy Theory, Practice and Outcomes

Stephane Ciriani, ORANGE and Marc Lebourges, France Telecom analyze The Role of Market Power in Economic Growth: An Analysis of the Differences between EU and US Competition Policy Theory, Practice and Outcomes.

ABSTRACT: The European Union has experienced relatively weak economic performance over the past fifteen years, notably compared to the U.S. In order to restore investment, innovation, and therefore growth, the European Commission seeks to raise the level of static competition in all markets. The Commission’s economic policy is largely determined by its competition policy. This policy is derived from its doctrine on competition law, which regards the exercise of market power as a source of inefficiency and advocates that its effects should be banned. By contrast, the U.S. competition authorities, under the influence of the Chicago School, consider that market power is a necessary incentive to invest and a fair return on investment. Recent findings in economic growth theory, which state that increased competition intensity may harm endogenous innovation, provide a theoretical basis to support the U.S. approach and call for a review of European doctrine.

 

January 16, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Banking Competition and Financial Stability: Evidence from CIS Countries

Cavid Nabiyev (Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic), Kanan Musayev (Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic), and Leyla Yusifzada (Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic) explore Banking Competition and Financial Stability: Evidence from CIS Countries.

ABSTRACT: The study provides empirical analysis of the cross-country relationship between a direct measure of competitive conduct of banking system and financial system in CIS countries during the period from 2001 to 2013. We determine the level of banking competition by using Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. Estimation results from Logit probability analysis reveal that the level of competition does not significantly affect the probability of banking crisis in such countries. However, a number of macroeconomic and institutional factors have a significant influence in financial stability. According to empirical results, higher inflation increases the probability of a banking crisis. On the other hand, credit growth decreases the probability of banking crisis in the investigated countries. These results are robust to the methodology when the interaction of concentration and h-statistic is used. The institutional factors have significant influence on preventing banking crises. Specifically, improvement in government effectiveness decreases the probability of banking crisis.

January 16, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 15, 2017

Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Announce Updated International Antitrust Guidelines

From the press release:

Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Announce Updated International Antitrust Guidelines

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued today revised Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation.  These guidelines update the 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations and provide guidance to businesses engaged in international activities on questions that concern the agencies’ international enforcement policy as well as the agencies’ related investigative tools and cooperation with foreign authorities.  

The revised guidelines reflect the growing importance of antitrust enforcement in a globalized economy and the agencies’ commitment to cooperating with foreign authorities on both policy and investigative matters.  

“Anticompetitive conduct that crosses borders can adversely affect our commerce with foreign nations.  The department’s antitrust enforcement is focused on ending that conduct in order to protect consumers and businesses in the United States,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse, in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  “The Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation released today provide important, up to date guidance to businesses engaged in international operations on our enforcement policies and priorities; the changes we have made to the international guidelines, last issued in 1995, reflect developments in the department’s practices and in the law over the last 22 years.  Developed jointly with the FTC, the Guidelines are another powerful example of the benefits of collaboration between our Agencies.”  

“The agencies’ enforcement of the U.S. antitrust laws now frequently involves activity outside the United States, increasingly requiring collaboration with international counterparts,” said Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the FTC.  “The Guidelines we are issuing today explain to the business and antitrust communities our current approaches to international enforcement policy and related investigative tools, and cooperation. They are the product of the excellent working relationship between our two agencies.”

The revisions describe the current practices and methods of analysis the agencies employ when determining whether to initiate and how to conduct investigations of, or enforcement actions against, conduct with an international dimension.  The Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation are different from the 1995 guidelines in several important ways.  In particular, they:

Add a chapter on international cooperation, which addresses the Agencies’ investigative tools, confidentiality safeguards, the legal basis for cooperation, types of information exchanged and waivers of confidentiality, remedies and special considerations in criminal investigations;
Update the discussion of the application of U.S. antitrust law to conduct involving foreign commerce, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, foreign sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign compulsion, the act of state doctrine and petitioning of sovereigns, in light of developments in both the law and the Agencies’ practice; and
Provide revised illustrative examples focused on the types of issues most commonly encountered. 

The agencies issued proposed revisions for public comment on Nov. 1, 2016, in response to which comments were received from practitioners, academics, economists, and other stakeholders.  Public comments are available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/guidelines-and-policy-statements-0/antitrust-guidelines-international-enforcement-and-cooperation-2017.

The Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation are available on the Department’s website at https://www.justice.gov/atr/internationalguidelines/download and the FTC’s website at www.ftc.gov/InternationalGuidelines.

The FTC vote approving the 2017 Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation was 3-0.

Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation

January 15, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 13, 2017

12th GCLC ANNUAL CONFERENCE DYNAMIC MARKETS AND DYNAMIC ENFORCEMENT: WHICH COMPETITION POLICY FOR A WORLD IN FLUX? 26-27 January 2017

12th GCLC ANNUAL CONFERENCE DYNAMIC MARKETS AND DYNAMIC ENFORCEMENT: WHICH COMPETITION POLICY FOR A WORLD IN FLUX? 26-27 January 2017

The advent of the digital revolution combined with the globalization process and, at EU level, the completion of the Single Market, have transformed the way businesses compete in today’s world. These phenomena are said to have significantly accelerated innovation cycles and the pace of change across many industries, while challenging the relevance of competition to deliver optimal welfare outcomes. Against this background, the conference will explore how competition policy has faced and accompanied the emergence of increasingly dynamic market environments and how it has developed strategies to ensure its lasting relevance both in the design of substantive principles and in enforcement practices. Likewise, it will attempt to capture how the implementation of innovative enforcement tools has affected outcomes and the evolution of the law. Associating lawyers and economists, practitioners and academics, the conference will therefore seek to assess the interplay between dynamic markets and dynamic enforcement strategies with a view to contributing to the design of an optimal competition policy for today’s world in flux.

Full program available HERE

Registration available HERE

Speakers include: Carl Baudenbacher, Jacques Bughin, Peter Camesasca, Ief Daems, Pascale Déchamps, Kris Dekeyser, Alexandre de Streel, David Evans, Damien Géradin, Thomas Graf, Mathew Heim, Pablo Ibanez-Colomo, Marc Jaeger, Thomas Janssens, Jérémie Jourdan, Wolfgang Kerber, William E. Kovacic, Johannes Laitenberger, Guillaume Loriot, Cecilio Madero, Munesh Mahtani, Philip Marsden, Massimo Merola, Bernd Meyring, Jörg Monar, Eric Morgan de Rivery, Andreas Mundt, Nicolas Petit, Etienne Pfister, Pierre Régibeau, Christine Varney, Thomas Vinje,  Mike Walker

January 13, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

DOJ and FTC Issue Updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

According to the press release:

DOJ and FTC Issue Updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

Update Reaffirms Role of Guidelines while Reflecting Developments in the Law
and the Agencies’ Enforcement and Policy Work

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued today updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property  (IP Licensing Guidelines) that explain how the federal antitrust agencies evaluate licensing and related activities involving patents, copyrights, trade secrets and know-how.  This update modernizes the IP Licensing Guidelines, which the agencies jointly issued in 1995, so they may continue to play a fundamental role in the agencies’ analysis of the licensing of intellectual property rights and provide guidance to the public and the business community about the agencies’ enforcement approach to intellectual property licensing.

The agencies announced the proposed update of the IP Licensing Guidelines and made a draft available for public comment in August 2016.  As described in that announcement, the proposed update reflected intervening changes in statutory and case law, as well as relevant enforcement and policy work, including the agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. During a 45-day comment period, the agencies received public comments from academics, private industries, law associations and non-profit organizations, which are available here.  After carefully reviewing and considering the comments, the agencies have now finalized the update.

 “Our modernized IP Licensing Guidelines continue to apply an effects-based analysis that puts the focus on evaluating harm to competition, not on harm to any individual competitor, and support procompetitive intellectual property licensing that can promote innovation,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.  “The comments we received were helpful in completing this update and also serve more broadly to better our understanding of some of today’s very complex antitrust issues that involve intellectual property rights.”

“Today, the Commission reaffirms its commitment to an economically grounded approach to antitrust analysis of IP licensing,” said Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the FTC.  “A strong and competitive IP licensing system benefits consumers and fosters innovation, by helping to ensure that inventors realize an appropriate return on their investment.”

In response to the desire of some commenters for the guidelines to more specifically address additional IP licensing activities, the agencies reiterate that the flexible effects-based enforcement framework set forth in the IP Licensing Guidelines remains applicable to all IP licensing activities.  In addition, the business community may consult the wide body of DOJ and FTC guidance available to the public – in the form of published agency reports, statements, speeches and enforcement decisions – which rely on this analytical framework and further illuminate each agency’s analysis of a variety of conduct involving intellectual property, including standards-setting activities and the assertion of standards-essential patents.

The updated IP Licensing Guidelines are available on the Department of Justice’s website here and the Federal Trade Commission’s website here.

Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

January 13, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dual Market Competition and Deposit Rate Setting in Islamic and Conventional Banks

Celine Meslier-Crouzille (LAPE); Tastaftiyan Risfandy (LAPE); and Amine Tarazi (LAPE) analyze Dual Market Competition and Deposit Rate Setting in Islamic and Conventional Banks.

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the issue of competition in dual banking markets by analyzing the determinants of deposit rates in Islamic and conventional banks. Using a sample of 20 countries with dual banking systems over the 2000-2014 period, our results show significant differences in the drivers of Islamic and conventional banks' pricing behavior. Conventional banks with stronger market power set lower deposit rates but market power is not significant for Islamic banks. In predominantly Muslim environments, conventional banks set higher deposit rates and further higher when their market power is lower. Whereas conventional banks are influenced by the competitiveness of Islamic banks, Islamic banks are only affected by their peers in predominantly Muslim countries. Our findings have important implications regarding competition and bank stability in dual banking markets.

January 13, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

Noriaki Matsushima and Shohei Yoshida explore The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters.

ABSTRACT: We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price. Furthermore, retailers' efficiency improvements increase the retail price if the dominant retailer's bargaining power is strong.

January 13, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Consumer confusion, obfuscation, and price regulation

Gu, Yiquan (Management School, University of Liverpool) and Wenzel, Tobias (Department of Economics, University of Bath) discuss Consumer confusion, obfuscation, and price regulation.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies firms’ obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high-cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that price regulation might be a useful policy in such an environment for two reasons: Introducing a price cap benefits consumers as it i) makes pricing more competitive and ii) reduces firms’ incentives to obfuscate. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low-cost firm.

January 13, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 12, 2017

Overconfident CEOs, product market competition, and corporate investment decisions

Po-Hsin Ho (National Taipei University) has a paper on Overconfident CEOs, product market competition, and corporate investment decisions.

ABSTRACT: This study further investigates the corporate investment decisions made by overconfident CEOs. The effect of overconfident CEOs on corporate investment decisions is widely examined in recent literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012; Chen, Ho and Ho, 2014; Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabberwa, 2013; Kolasinski and Li, 2013). The literature indicates that overconfident CEOs overinvest. In a recent article, Kolasinski and Li (2013) find well governed firms could mitigate the overinvestment problem caused by overconfident CEOs. However, the literature ignores the role of product market competition in corporate investment decisions. Giround and Mueller (2010, 2011) find that competitive industries can substitute corporate governance to force managers to work hard. This study thus examines the influence of market competition on managerial overconfidence and reexamines the investment-cash sensitivity and merger activities of overconfident CEOs. We propose two competing hypotheses to study whether the investment behavior of overconfident CEOs differs under different competition structures. Our findings suggest that intense market competition mitigates the overinvestment and merger tendency of overconfident CEOs.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries

Ifrach, Bar (Airbnb) and Weintraub, Gabriel Y. (Columbia University) offer A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we introduce a new computationally tractable framework for Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic oligopoly models that overcomes the computational complexity involved in computing Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). First, we define a new equilibrium concept that we call momentbased Markov equilibrium (MME), in which firms keep track of their own state, the detailed state of dominant firms, and few moments of the distribution of fringe firms' states. Second, we provide guidelines to use MME in applied work and illustrate with an application how it can endogenize the market structure in a dynamic industry model even with hundreds of firms. Third, we develop a series of results that provide support for using MME as an approximation. We present numerical experiments showing that MME approximates MPE for important classes of models. Then, we introduce novel unilateral deviation error bounds that can be used to test the accuracy of MME as an approximation in large-scale settings. Overall, our new framework opens the door to study novel issues in industry dynamics.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Optimal Completeness of Property Rights on Renewable Resources in Presence of Market Power

Alexandre CROUTZET ; Pierre LASSERRE examine Optimal Completeness of Property Rights on Renewable Resources in Presence of Market Power.

ABSTRACT: There are many instances where property rights are imperfectly defined, incomplete, or imperfectly enforced. The purpose of this normative paper is to address the following question:are there conditions under which partial property rights are economically efficient in a renewable resource economy? To address this question, we treat the level of completeness of property rights as a continuous variable in a renewable resource economy. By design, property rights restrict access to the resource, so that they may allow a limited number of firms to exercise market power. We show that there exists a level of property rights completeness that leads to first-best resource exploitation; this level is different from either absent or complete property rights. Complete rights are neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency in presence of market power. We derive an analytic expression for the optimal level of property rights completeness and discuss its policy relevance and information requirements. The optimal level depends on i) the number of firms; ii) the elasticity of input productivity and iii) the price elasticity of market demand. We also find that a greater difference between the respective values of input and output requires stronger property rights. In fact, high profits both imply a severe potential commons problem and may be the expression of market power; strong property rights limit the commons problem; their incompleteness offsets market power. Biology also impacts the optimal quality of property rights: when the stock of resource is more sensitive to harvesting efforts, optimal property rights need to be more complete.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Contract contingency in vertically related markets

E. Bacchiega; O. Bonroy; and E. Petrakis offer Contract contingency in vertically related markets.

ABSTRACT: We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may sell to two vertically differentiated downstream firms. The upstream supplier can offer an exclusive contract to one of the firms or non-exclusive contracts to both firms. Each of the latter can be made contingent or not on the breakdown of the negotiations between the upstream supplier and the rival downstream firm. The distribution of bargaining power during the contract terms negotiations is the main driving force of the monopolist's choices. A powerful supplier always opts for an exclusive contract. By contrast, a weaker supplier offers non-exclusive contracts and makes each of them contingent or non-contingent such as to guarantee the most favorable outside option in its negotiations. Our main results hold under an horizontally differentiated downstream market too.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Evolutionary Cournot competition with endogenous technology choice: (in)stability and optimal policy

Lamantia, F. (University of Amsterdam); Negriu, A. (University of Amsterdam); and Tuinstra, J. (University of Amsterdam) offer Evolutionary Cournot competition with endogenous technology choice: (in)stability and optimal policy.

ABSTRACT: We study a dynamic oligopoly market model where quantity setting firms can choose one of two production technologies. We find that boundedly rationality in production (best-reply dynamics) and technology choice (evolutionary selection of better performing technologies) as sources of market dynamics, can generate endogenous instability and complicated dynamics, including chaotic fluctuations and co-existing attractors with fractal basins of attraction. By studying successively more complex versions of our model we analyze these two different sources of instability separately and also investigate their interaction. We find that boundedly rational production decisions amplify technological instability whereas boundedly rational technology decisions do not contribute to the production-driven destabilization of the Nash equilibrium. In any case, whenever the two types of decisions interfere in an endogenously unstable market, fluctuations follow a visibly different pattern compared to the fluctuations of a market with only one source of instability. Finally, we show that an innovation policy that aims to alter the market equilibrium without taking into account off-equilibrium dynamics may, in an intrinsically dynamic world, generate welfare losses by destabilizing a stable equilibrium and/or by raising the amplitude of market fluctuations.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited

Garrod, Luke and Olczak, Matthew have written on Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited.

ABSTRACT:  Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories of collusion often do not distinguish between the two. In this paper, we address this issue and ask: under which types of market structures are cartels likely to arise when firms can alternatively collude tacitly? To answer this question, we analyse an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make secret price cuts. Tacit collusion can involve price wars on the equilibrium path. Explicit collusion involves firms secretly sharing their private information in an illegal cartel to avoid such price wars. However, this runs the risk of sanctions. We find that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom but consistent with the available empirical evidence, cartels are least likely to arise in markets with a few symmetric firms, because tacit collusion is relatively more appealing in such markets. We discuss the implications for anti-cartel enforcement policy.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Market power in the portfolio: Product market competition and mutual fund performance

Stephan Jaspersen discovers Market power in the portfolio: Product market competition and mutual fund performance.

ABSTRACT: I provide evidence that fund managers who overweight firms with the most differentiated products ('monopolies') exhibit a superior risk-adjusted performance. This is consistent with information advantages due to a better understanding of qualitative information on a firm's competitive environment. I find that funds with above median monopoly bets outperform by up to 92 basis points annually and trade more successfully in both their monopoly and nonmonopoly sub-portfolios. My identification strategy includes exogenous shocks to information quality using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to a firm's product market environment using the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I document that managers who place larger monopoly bets are less likely to invest into rival firms at the same time, have a longer investment horizon, and hold more illiquid and high quality stocks.

January 12, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 11, 2017

Substitution and Complementarity between Fixed-line and Mobile Access

Chengsi Wang (University of Mannheim) and Julian Wright (National University of Singapore) offer Substitution and Complementarity between Fixed-line and Mobile Access.

ABSTRACT: Platforms use price parity clauses to prevent sellers charging lower prices when selling through other channels. Platforms justify these restraints by noting they are needed to prevent free-riding, which would undermine their incentives to invest in their platform. In this paper, we study the effect of price parity clauses on three different types of platform investment, and evaluate these restraints taking into account these investment effects. We find, that wide price parity clauses lead to excessive platform investment while without such price parity clauses there is insufficient platform investment. Even taking these investment effects into account, wide price parity clauses always lower consumer surplus and often lowers total welfare.

January 11, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Global Value Chains in Competition Law - Wednesday 1 February 2017, 14:30 - 19:30

Global Value Chains in Competition Law

Wednesday 1 February 2017, 14:30 - 19:30

UCL Cruciform Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT

A conference organised by the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL

“The paradigm of the world political economy has shifted dramatically over the past twenty years. Legal scholarship, however, lags significantly behind. Existing legal scholarship is calibrated to an outdated model that suggests that multinational corporations – either individually or through one-to-one supplier relationships — create, manufacture, and sell a given product. But in today’s world, in what have been termed ‘global value chains’ the research, design, production, and retail of most products take place through coordinated chain components that stretch systemically across multiple – from a few to a few thousand – firms […] (t)he most important paradigm for understanding the global economy, and the political and social relationships that both guide it and stem from it, is no longer the template of the market but rather the role of global value chains” (K.B. SOBEL-READ, (2014), Global value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, Transnational Legal Theory, 5(3), pp. 364-407, 364 & 367)

Global Value Chains are prevalent in the global economy. A recent joint OECD, WTO and World bank report indicates that between 30% and 60% of G20 countries’ exports consist of intermediate inputs traded within GVCs. Economic production is increasingly structured around GVCs, which permit the simultaneous and coordinated transnational production and distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of the supply chain has to manage effectively, without this involving vertical integration by ownership. These supply chains start from the factors of production and other inputs needed for the production of a good and end up with distribution of the end product to the final consumer. Firms find it crucial to enter into long-term agreements with partners in other segments of a value chain, in order to create the necessary relation of trust that is required by the importance of relation specific investments that need to be undertaken in setting the supply chain management. This may lead to disintermediation and vertical integration but also to de-concentration through the constitution of networks or supply alliances that are managed by supply chain councils.

With some exceptions GVCs have not been explored systematically by competition law. The concept offers an important analytical potential. The most obvious one relates to the transnational dimension it brings forward, calling for a “transnational coordination” between “destination states” and “producer states”, this coordination being pursued at global, regional or bilateral levels, and raising interesting questions as to the scope of the extraterritorial enforcement of competition law, in particular with regard to “transformed products”. A deeper impact could be the re-conceptualization of the way competition law deals with vertical integration or quasi-integration and the more holistic perspective the concept of global value chain may ask from competition law enforcement, also with regard to its interaction with other competition policies.

 

Scope of the Conference The conference will explore these different dimensions of the global value chain concept in competition law. The first part will focus on the delimitation of this concept and will discuss its usefulness as an operational concept in competition law, looking in particular to its trans-national dimension and the international aspects of competition law enforcement. The second and third parts of the conference will take an industry-specific perspective and will explore how the concept of global value chain may alter the way we conceptualize the role and tasks of competition law with regard to global digital value chains and global food value chains. Issues, such as the implications of big data, the development of digital platforms, the gatekeeping role of search engines, the quest for network neutrality, the increasing consolidation of the factors of production sector in food, the global strategies of retailers will be explored from the angle of Global Value Chains theory with the aim to understand how this may challenge “the familiar landmarks of our thought” in competition law and economics and how we may need to reconsider the current model of competition law enforcement in these areas.

 

The Speakers:

  • Tembinkosi Bonakele, Commissioner, the Competition Commission of South Africa
  • Philippe Chauve, Head, Food Task Force, European Commission
  • Kevin Coates, Convington & Burling, Brussels
  • Dennis Davis, President, Competition Tribunal of South Africa
  • Ariel Ezrachi, Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, University of Oxford
  • Alexey Ivanov, HSE-Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, Moscow
  • Marcio de Oliveira Junior, Professor of economics, University Center of Brasília, former head of CADE (Brazilian competition authority)
  • Bill Kovacic, Professor at the George Washington University School of Law, Non-executive Director UK CMA, former head of the US Federal Trade Commission
  • Ioannis Lianos, Professor of Global Competition Law and Public Policy, UCL
  • Damien Neven, Consultant, Compass Lexecon, former chief economist, European Commission
  • Pierre Regibeau, Vice President, Charles River Associates
  • Simon Roberts, Professor at the University of Johannesburg
  • Krishna Ravi Sirinivas, Consultant at RIS, India
  • Florian Wagner von Papp, Reader in Laws, UCL

Modestly priced tickets available from: http://www.laws.ucl.ac.uk/event/global-value-chains-in-competition-law/

January 11, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy (American Casebook Series) 3rd Edition

Now out is Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy (American Casebook Series) 3rd Edition.

CASEBOOK ABSTRACT: The third edition of Gavil, Kovacic and Baker’s Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy thoroughly updates the second edition.  It includes a more accessible treatment of the rule of reason, a further modernized treatment of collusion, the most comprehensive merger chapter available, an innovative new chapter on distribution strategies, and a refreshed and updated treatment of intellectual property and innovation.  For the third edition, the authors are joined by former FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, who is now University Professor and Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University.

January 11, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The impact of advertising length caps on TV: Evidence from the French broadcast TV industry

Jiekai ZHANG (INSEE-CREST) idetifies The impact of advertising length caps on TV: Evidence from the French broadcast TV industry.

ABSTRACT: The quantities of advertising on TV are regulated in France, as in many other developed countries. This paper aims at understanding the welfare implication of such regulation. It is the first paper which investigates this issue with a structural econometric model in two-sided market framework. I construct an unique database of per hour data on 12 main broadcast TV stations in France during one year (2014) to estimate structurally the demand and supply in the French broadcast television industry. I identify the shadow prices of regulation caps on advertising quantities, using the difference in estimated marginal costs between the binding and non-binding regulation constraints. A counterfactual experiment is carried out to quantify the exact impact of regulation. The results suggest that the TV channels advertise more without regulation but the overall impact of the current regulatory regime is small. The welfare analysis suggests that the current regulation framework is unnecessary, since it constrained the profit of TV channels without improving significantly the welfare of TV viewers.

January 11, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)