Thursday, April 30, 2015

False Accusation of Rolling Stone Article Suggests prior Notification of Targets in White-collar Cases

In November Rolling Stone published a blockbuster article about a student's account of being  gang-raped at a University of Virginia frat house.  Within days others, primarily the Washington Post, sharply questioned the truthfulness of the student's claim.  Rolling Stone then commissioned an independent investigation by Steve Coll, the respected Dean of Columbia Journalism School, to review the magazine's reporting, editing and fact-checking.  That report, written by Coll and two colleagues, came out a few weeks ago.  See hereRolling Stone also "withdrew" the article.

The report (Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll, Derek Kravitz, "An Anatomy of a Journalistic Failure") is "intended as a work of journalism about a failure of journalism." It is thorough and comprehensive and, as expected, clear and thoughtful.  Although the purpose of the report was to investigate the conduct of Rolling Stone and not the conduct of the student, it treats the student who made the false accusation and continued it over months of questioning by the reporter much too gently and itself is affected by the implicit bias that it suggests motivated the writer.  For instance, it takes pains to state that the student who made the indisputably false accusation may well have in fact been a victim of some predatory sexual act(s), and does not even speculate that she might have made up the incident out of whole cloth.  It expresses its regret that the the widely-disseminated revelation of the false accusation might cast doubt on other campus sex accusations (accepting the questionable estimates that false charges make up  less than 8% of rape allegations) and fails even to consider the possibility that the false claim here might not be such an aberration , and perhaps will serve a salutary purpose by increasing public (and governmental and institutional) awareness that false accusations are not so infrequent. 

To be sure, campus sexual abuse by male students against women is a serious problem and deserves vigorous, but measured and fair, action by universities and, when appropriate, law enforcement, and aggressive reporting on that subject is important to increase public knowledge.  School officials, and magazine and newspaper writers (and also law enforcement officers)  should be mindful, however, that this is an area where accusations are often inaccurate,  exaggerated, and sometimes downright false, and that there are sometimes unjust findings and convictions, by courts and schools, that wrongly destroy the lives of those accused.  Indeed, in my opinion, rape is the area of criminal law in which there are the most intentionally false (as opposed to mistaken) accusations by civilian complainants.

The report demonstrates convincingly that there were a series of errors in the investigation, review, fact-checking and editing of the story before it appeared.  Among those errors was the failure to give the person accused an opportunity to refute the accusations.  "Journalistic practice - and basic fairness - require that if a reporter intends to publish derogatory information about anyone, he or she should seek that person's side of the story."

I could not help but thinking that the defective  oversight  of the Rolling Stone journalists and their seemingly limited concern for the reputations of the institutions accused were nonetheless far greater and far more likely to uncover false accusations than the minimal or nonexistent review by law enforcement  that typically occurs in a criminal case prior to an arrest (and sometimes even after).  Once law enforcement officers decide to make an arrest, why should the accused not be allowed to present beforehand his "side of the story?"  Obviously, in many cases, such as where there is a need for immediate apprehension by a police officer, no pre-arrest review or notification is possible. Further,  in many other cases, for instance where the identity of the alleged perpetrator is unknown, or where there is a reasonable fear that if not arrested he will flee and not be available to face charges, an immediate unannounced arrest is called for. 

However, in many, probably most, white-collar cases, there is no such need. In those cases, as a general rule a prosecutor should notify a target that he is under investigation and seek his "side of the story."  Nonetheless, many prosecutors proceed the "old-fashioned" way by ordering an arrest first without giving the defendant an opportunity to hire a lawyer and present, should he choose to, his side of the story.

Notifying a prospective defendant that he is likely to be arrested and may choose to present his case beforehand has advantages for prosecutors in many situations. The defendant and his lawyer might provide evidence or legal arguments that will persuade the prosecutor to seek lesser charges or not to go forward at all.  Sometimes a plea agreement might be reached with the defendant which will eliminate the need for a time-consuming grand jury presentation.  And, should the defendant decide to cooperate, he may be able to do so proactively and generally more effectively since an indictment often tips off others to steer clear of him.

There are, arguably, certain benefits to law enforcement in making surprise arrests. There is a  possibility that an upset, unprepared  and  uncounseled defendant will make incriminating statements.  And, a defendant may have on his person or in proximity evidentiary items which will be found by a search.  Those advantages, however,  are less likely to occur in white-collar case, where defendants are less likely to make statements without lawyers or carry contraband or evidence.  Another potential benefit to prosecutors  is that at bail hearings a defendant's attorney may not be able to argue  that the defendant did not flee after becoming aware of the charges.  Such an argument, I have found, does not carry as much weight as it should. In any case, prosecutors are unlikely to provide prior notification of their intent to arrest to any who are conceivable flight risks.

For these reasons, the most successful and sophisticated prosecutors in white collar cases, such as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, generally notify white-collar targets of their investigations and give them or their attorneys an opportunity to dissuade, minimize or deal.  Less sophisticated prosecutors of white-collar crimes, often state prosecutors, are more likely to make summary arrests.  These cases, generally not well vetted since there was no input from the accused or his counsel, more often lead to dismissals, acquittals or cheap pleas.

Not only is pre-arrest notification to a prospective defendant more fair to him in that it gives him  an opportunity to defend, explain, negotiate or prepare psychologically, it will benefit judicial and prosecutorial economy of resources by allowing for some matters to be settled with less or no litigation and court involvement.  And, as discussed above, it helps law enforcement.   It should be the default position in white-collar (and many other) cases, and deviated from only when there are genuine countervailing reasons.

 

April 30, 2015 in Attorney Fees, Books, Current Affairs, Investigations, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 24, 2015

Terms Within the DP for Deutsche Bank

The Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) is available online on the DOJ website here. Like so many DPAs, this one has terms that place the sole discretion on certain matters with the DOJ. For example,

"Deutsche Bank agrees that in the event that the Department determines, in its sole discretion, that Deutsche Bank has knowingly violated any provision of this Agreement, an extension or extensions of the term of the Agreement may be imposed by the Department, in its sole discretion, for up to a total additional time period of one year, without prejudice to the Department's right to proceed as provided in Paragraphs 13-16 below."

As with many DPAs, it calls for continued compliance, a monitor, and disclosure of information (not covered by the attorney-client privilege, etc.).  The agreement allows Deutsche Bank to propose three names of monitors to the government - although the government gets to choose.  Bottom line is that if the company complies with the DPA (which is within the sole discretion of the government to decide) the criminal Information gets dismissed.  Another problematic provision within the DPA is that:

"Deutsche Bank expressly agrees that it shall not, through present or future attorneys, officers, directors, employees, agents or any other person authorized to speak for Deutsche Bank or its subsidiaries or affiliates, make any public statement, in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by Deutsche Bank set forth above or the facts described in the attached Statement of Facts."

Is it really necessary to place so much discretion with the government in the DPA?  Shouldn't a court get to decide if there is a violation of a DPA?  Should First Amendment rights be allowed to be discarded in a DPA? We will probably never know the answer to these questions because companies in a post-Arthur Andersen world can't take a risk of fighting the government. Most just sign the DPA, try their best to comply, and hope they can move on.  For a discussion of terms within DPAs, see my co-authored article here.

(esp)

April 24, 2015 in Deferred Prosecution Agreements | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

DP for Deutsche Bank Subsidiary to Pay $2.5 Billion

DOJ Press Release here today -

"DB Group Services (UK) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), has agreed to plead guilty to wire fraud for its role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark interest rate used in financial products and transactions around the world.  In addition, Deutsche Bank entered into a  deferred prosecution agreement to resolve wire fraud and antitrust charges in connection with its role in both manipulating U.S. Dollar LIBOR and engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy to rig Yen LIBOR. Together, Deutsche Bank and its subsidiary will pay $775 million in criminal penalties to the Justice Department."

"The agreement requires the bank to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation, to pay a $625 million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon DB Group Services (UK) Limited and to retain a corporate monitor for the three-year term of the agreement."

"Together with approximately $1.744 billion in regulatory penalties and disgorgement—$800 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action, $600 million as a result of a New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) action, and $344 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action—the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of penalties to approximately $2.519 billion."

(esp)

April 24, 2015 in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 23, 2015

In the News & Around the Blogosphere

Jennifer Steinhauer, NYTimes, Senate Confirms Loretta Lynch as Attorney General After Long Delay

Michael S. Schmidt  & Matt Apuzzo, NYTimes, David Petraeus Is Sentenced to Probation in Leak Investigation

(esp)

April 23, 2015 in News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Ninth Circuit En Banc Reverses Barry Bond's Conviction

An en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Bonds, reverses the obstruction of justice conviction against then professional baseball player Barry Bonds finding insufficient evidence of materiality under the statute, 18 U.S.C. s 1503. The decision is per curiam, with several concurring opinions, and one dissent.

Hon. Kozinski, joined by Judges O'Scannlain, Graber, Callahan, and Nguyen commence with a single question - "Can a single non-responsive answer by a grand jury witness support a conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. s 1503? In answering this question, they speak about how "[s]tretched to its limits, section 1503 poses a significant hazard for everyone involved in our system of justice, because so much of what the adversary process calls for could be construed as obstruction."  They continue to state that "[b]ecause the statute sweeps so broadly, due process calls for prudential limitations on the government's power to prosecute under it."  The limitation they place is a requirement of materiality.  They find materiality lacking here.

The next concurring opinion also speaks to a requirement of materiality, finding that "a single truthful but evasive or misleading statement can never be material." Hon. Reinhardt's concurring opinion simply says that a single non-responsive answer by a grand jury witness cannot support a 1503 conviction. 

And although Hon. Fletcher disagrees with the rationale, focusing on the word corruptly in the statute finds it insufficient here.

Only Hon. Rawlinson does not want to second guess the jury decision and doesn't want to rely on perjury law as some of the concurrences did. The jury was instructed on materiality and that should be sufficient.

What fascinates me about this case is whether everyone is in the same ballpark. For all the reasons provided by everyone other than the dissent, one should not have an obstruction conviction based on this limited statement. But most imply that materiality is an element of obstruction.  I have argued in a past Article that it should be - here.  And it is wonderful to see so many on this court adhering to that position and taking this point as a given. But the statute may not be as clear and the law as consistent as it should be.  This case is important for taking this important step and demonstrating the absurdity of a conviction that fails to have materiality as a key component.

(esp)

April 22, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Obstruction, Prosecutions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Second Circuit Denies Rehearing of Insider Trading Case Reversal

   Earlier this month, the Second Circuit, as expected (at least by me), denied Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara's request for reargument and reconsideration of its December 2014 ruling in United States v Newman which narrowed, at least in the Second Circuit, the scope of insider trading prosecutions. I would not be surprised if the government seeks certiorari, and, I would not be all that surprised it cert were granted.

   In Newman, the defendants, Newman and Chiasson, were two hedge fund portfolio managers who were at the end of a chain of recipients of inside information originally provided by employees of publicly-traded technology funds. The defendants traded on the information and realized profits of $4 million and $68 million respectively. There was, however,  scant, if any, evidence that the defendants were aware whether the original tippors had received any personal benefit for their disclosures.

   The Second Circuit reversed the trial convictions based on an improper charge to the jury and the insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, the court ruled that:

       1)  the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that in order to convict it had to find that the defendants knew that the corporate employee tippors had received a personal benefit for divulging the information; and

       2)  the government had indeed failed to prove that the tippors had in fact received a personal benefit.

   Thus, at least in the Second Circuit, it appears that the casual passing on of inside information without receiving compensation by a friend or relative or golf partner does not violate the security laws. "For purposes of insider trading liability, the insider's disclosure of confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach," said the court.  Nor, therefore,  does trading on such information incur insider trading liability because the liability of a recipient, if any, must derive from the liability of the tippor.  To analogize to non-white collar law, one cannot be convicted of possessing stolen property unless the property had been stolen (and the possessor knew it).  Those cases of casual passing on of information, which sometimes ensnared ordinary citizens with big mouths and a bit of greed, are thus apparently off-limits to Second Circuit prosecutors. To be sure, the vast majority of the recent spate of Southern District prosecutions of insider trading cases have involved individuals who have sold and bought information and their knowing accomplices.  Although Southern District prosecutors will sometimes now face higher hurdles to prove an ultimate tippee/trader's knowledge, I doubt that the ruling will affect a huge number of prosecutions.

   The clearly-written opinion, by Judge Barrington Parker, did leave open, or at least indefinite, the critical question of what constitutes a "personal benefit" to a provider of inside information (an issue that also might impact corruption cases). The court stated that the "personal benefit" had to be something "of consequence."  In some instances, the government had argued that a tippee's benefit was an intangible like the good graces of the tippor, and jurors had  generally accepted such a claim, likely believing the tippor would expect some personal benefit, present or future, for disclosing confidential information. In Newman, the government similarly argued that the defendants had to have known the tippors had to have received some benefit.

   Insider trading is an amorphous crime developed by prosecutors and courts - not Congress - from a general fraud statute (like mail and wire fraud) whose breadth is determined by the aggressiveness and imagination of prosecutors and how much deference courts give their determinations. In this area, the highly competent and  intelligent prosecutors of the Southern District have pushed the envelope, perhaps enabled to some extent by noncombative defense lawyers who had their clients cooperate and plead guilty despite what, at least with hindsight, seems to have been a serious question of legal sufficiency.  See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983)(test for determining insider liability is whether "insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly").  As the Newman court refreshingly said, in language that should be heeded by prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers, "[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under [SEC Rule]  10(b)."

  As I said, I would not be shocked (although I would be surprised) if Congress were to enact a law that goes beyond effectively overruling Newman and imposes insider trading liability on any person trading based on what she knew was non-public confidential information whether or not the person who had disclosed the information had received a personal benefit. Such a law, while it would to my regret cover the casual offenders I have discussed, would on balance  be a positive one in that it would limit the unequal information accessible to certain traders and provide a more level playing field.

 (goldman)

 

 

April 14, 2015 in Congress, Corruption, Defense Counsel, Fraud, Insider Trading, Judicial Opinions, Prosecutions, Prosecutors, Securities, Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 10, 2015

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Makes It Official: Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Is Broader Than Brady

The case, handed down yesterday, is In Re Kline. This matter has wound its way through the disciplinary process for years. I posted about it here in 2012 and here in 2013.

Kline was prosecuting Arnell Shelton for the shooting of Christopher Boyd. Shelton had filed an alibi notice and "the reliability of the government's identification witnesses" was the principal issue at the 2002 trial, according to the Report and Recommendation of Hearing Committee Number Nine ("Report and Recommendation").

Kline spoke with Metropolitan Police Department Officer Edward Woodward in preparation for trial. Kline took contemporaneous notes. Woodward was the first officer at the scene of the crime and spoke to victim Boyd at the hospital shortly after the shooting. According to the Report and Recommendation, Kline's notes of his conversation with Woodward were, in pertinent part, as follows: "Boyd told officer at hospital that he did not know who shot him–appeared maybe to not want to cooperate at the time. He was in pain and this officer had arrested him for possession of a machine gun."

At trial Boyd identified Shelton as the shooter. According to Bar Counsel, Kline never disclosed Boyd's hospital statement to the defense despite a specific Brady/Giglio request for impeachment material. The other identification witnesses were weak and/or impeachable.  The case ended in a hung jury mistrial and the alleged Brady material (that is, Boyd's hospital statement to Woodward) was not revealed to the defense until literally the eve of the second trial, even though DC-OUSA prosecutors and supervisors had known about it for some time.

The court offered defense counsel a continuance, but she elected to go to trial as her client was then in jail. The second trial ended in Shelton's conviction. You can consult my earlier posts for a more detailed factual and case history background.

Rule 3.8(e) of the DC Rules of Professional Conduct states in pertinent part that: "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not . . . intentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible, any evidence or information that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused...except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by protective order of the tribunal."

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the position of D.C. Bar Counsel and the Board that Rule 3.8(e) is not synonymous with Brady v. Maryland. The Court declined to import Brady's materiality test into Rule 3.8(e), making it clear that at the pre-trial and trial stages  of a case, no prosecutor is fit to make a speculative materiality analysis. The rule is now clear. Any evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant must be disclosed under the D.C. Rules of Professional Responsibility.

The Court overturned the Board's 30-day sanction imposed against Kline, given the confusion engendered by the Commentary to Rule 3.8(e). The Commentary states in part that: "The rule...is not intended either to restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States Constitution, federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of procedure." Courts in other jurisdictions, as well as the ABA, have construed the D.C. Rule as including the Brady materiality standard, based on this Commentary. Additionally, at the time of Kline's actions, DC-USAO's training taught that Rule 3.8(e) was synonymous with Brady. The Court held that even if the Commentary was inconsistent with the Rule, the plain language of the Rule, and its legislative history, prevailed.

"However, while clear and convincing evidence has been presented that Kline violated Rule 3.8 when he failed to turn over the Boyd Hospital Statement to the defense prior to trial, we are mindful of the fact that our comment to Rule 3.8 (e) has created a great deal of confusion when it comes to a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under Rule 3.8. Thus, Kline's understanding of his ethical obligations, while erroneous, does not warrant an ethical sanction."

The Board originally found that the suppressed exculpatory statement was material, even though a subsequent jury in possession of the material convicted the defendant. I don't know if that finding was ever revisited. I mention it because the Court's opinion nowhere discusses this point and seems to assume that the withheld statement was immaterial.

The opinion by Chief Judge Washington is extremely well-crafted and enormously significant.

Hat Tip to Charles Burnham of Burnham & Gorokhov for informing me of this ruling  and sending a copy.

(wisenberg)

 

April 10, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 3, 2015

Samuel J. Buffone: 1946-2015

I am deeply saddened to report the death of Samuel J. Buffone, a giant in the D.C. and national white collar bars. Sam was not only one of the greatest appellate craftsmen of all time. He was also a consummate professional, gentleman, scholar and mentor. Sam was most recently a partner at BuckleySandler. Before that he was at Ropes & Gray, as chair of the Government Enforcement Practice Group, and Tigar and Buffone. I first met Sam during the Victoria Savings & Loan sentencings and appeals in the early nineties. He was a quiet man of dignity and grace, and a selfless friend to me when I crossed over to the defense bar and moved to Washington. Sam Buffone will truly be missed by the many friends and colleagues he leaves behind and whose lives he has enriched. Here is a tribute to Sam, posted today on the BuckleySandler website by Andrew Sandler.

(wisenberg)

April 3, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 2, 2015

More on Menendez

Courtesy of NPR.

(wisenberg)

 

April 2, 2015 in Investigations | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 1, 2015

Menendez

Here is the Indictment in United States v. Robert Menendez and Salomon Melgen. Here is the Washington Post story.

(wisenberg)

April 1, 2015 in Prosecutions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Practice Notes: First Circuit Cases Yield White Collar Rulings on Materiality and Upward Variance/Departure

Two white collar decisions emerged last week from the First Circuit, both related to the Rwandan genocide.

United States v. Kantengwa reinforces an old truth for white collar practitioners. If you don't win on materiality at trial, you are totally screwed on appeal. According to the First Circuit, the appellant was "a member of a prominent political family allegedly involved in the Rwandan genocide." Katengwa was indicted for perjury under 18 U.S. Code 1621 (1) for false statements she told under oath in an asylum application and subsequent removal proceedings. Katengwa argued, among other things, that the government was precluded from bringing perjury charges against her because an immigration judge had already ruled that her false statements did not "go to the heart" of her asylum claim. Assuming, without deciding, that an administrative finding of fact can preclude later criminal charges, the First Circuit rejected Katengwa's collateral estoppel claim, because "materiality" under 1621 (1) and the "heart of the matter rule" in immigration law involve two distinct standards. "The heart of the matter rule from immigration law prohibits basing an adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies in an applicant's testimony that do not go to the heart of [her] claim." (Internal quotes and citations omitted.) But, "a statement is material in a criminal prosecution for perjury under § 1621(1) if it is 'material to any proper matter of the [decisionmaker's] inquiry.' United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)." The First Circuit made clear, through a litany of examples, that this test can cover a multitude of subsidiary matters to the decisionmaker's overall inquiry. Translation: In all but the rarest cases, materiality is an argument you make to the jury. It can serve as a nice hook for jury nullification. Don't expect it to lead to victory on appeal.

In  United States v. Munyenyezi, Katengwa's sister was indicted on "two counts of procuring citizenship illegally by making false statements to the government. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1425(a) and (b)." The jury hung in her first trial, but the second trial produced convictions. She raised several issues on appeal, but the one that concerns me here is the sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum. Munyenyezi's Guidelines Range was 0-6 months, and she attacked the sentence on appeal as substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit called this, "a tough sell," reiterating its abuse of discretion standard of review and precedent that "as long as we see 'a plausible sentencing rationale' that reaches 'a defensible result,' the sentence stands. United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)." The trial judge imposed the 120 month sentence under alternative theories. He granted an upward departure under Guidelines Section 5K2.0 for an aggravating circumstance of a kind or degree not adequately taken into accoount by the Guidelines. He also upwardly departed under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 (a). As every schoolboy knows, and as the First Circuit reminds us, "Section 3553(a) lets a judge vary upward based on factors listed there, like the defendant's background (including her criminal history), the circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect and deter others, the need to promote respect for the law and to provide a just punishment, and the need to eliminate unjustified sentencing disparities." And the First Circuit also reminds us, albeit in a footnote, that "[u]nder certain circumstances a judge can also vary downward using section 3553(a)." You don't say!

Interestingly, the trial judge did not upwardly depart/vary because of Munyenyezi's alleged "participation in genocidal conduct." He sentenced her to the statutory maximum because, "'lying about participation in genocide when specifically asked,' the judge explained, knowing full well 'that such conduct is automatically disqualifying with respect to immigration and citizenship seriously undermines the integrity of this country's immigration standards in the most offensive way' imaginable." The judge later noted that if he had sentenced Munyenyezi for her alleged genocidal conduct, he would not have imposed concurrent sentences.

There are often silver linings in decisional clouds. An appellate court that uphold a 3553 (a) upward variance of ten years can also uphold a 10 year downward variance. The precedent cuts both ways.

(wisenberg)

March 31, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, March 28, 2015

Second Circuit Clarifies Nature of Deliberation Under Guidelines Section 2A6.1(b)(6)

Christine Wright-Darrisaw was found guilty of threatening the President under 18 U.S. Code Section 871(a). Ms. Wright-Darrisaw experienced a negative result in her local Family Court. She called the White House switchboard and, after two and one-half minutes of incoherent barnyard gibbersih, threatened to fornicate and kill President Obama. She was entitled to a four point reduction in her offense level under Guidelines Section 2A6.1(b)(6) if the sentencing court found that "the offense involved a single instance evidencing little or no deliberation." The trial judge refused to grant the reduction, noting that the very act of contacting the White House involved deliberation. According to the Second Circuit, "the explanation provided by the district court suggests that the court may have been too sweeping in its consideration of what constitutes deliberation cognizable under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(6)." The "deliberation" to be considered under 2A6.1(b)6) "is deliberation related to the communication of the threat itself. Only if a defendant's course of conduct leading up to and following the time the threat was made is closely tied to the communication of the threat, or if the defendant makes any effort to carry out the threat, may the conduct then provide a basis for inferring deliberation sufficient to reject the four-level reduction." Although the call here was deliberate, the threat may not have been. Since it appears that the district court conflated the two concepts, the Second Circuit remanded for re-analysis of the deliberation issue. Examining holdings in sister circuits, the Second Circuit focused on two critical factors in determining whether deliberation is present: "(1) whether, and under what circumstances, the threat itself has been repeated and (2) whether there is evidence of planning or some effort to carry out the threat." In Wright-Darrisaw's case, it is undisputed that the threat against President Obama was not repeated. (However, there were abundant past threats against neighbors, strangers, President Bush, and other officials.) Thus, the only question on remand is whether "there is sufficient evidence of planning or some effort to carry out the threat." The case is  United States v. Wright-Darrisaw.

 Wright-Darrisaw's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against her was deferred pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014).

(wisenberg)

March 28, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

4th NACDL White Collar Crime College at Stetson - 2105 Award to Hank Asbill (JonesDay)

The NACDL White Collar Crime College at Stetson completed an exhausting and exhilarating program with top white collar defenders teaching white collar advocacy skills to practitioners. This year, the instructors teaching in the program were:

A. Brian Albritton, Henry  "Hank" W. Asbill, Brian   H. Bieber, Barry Boss, Ellen C. Brotman, Preston Burton, Jean-Jacques Cabou, Robert M. Cary, Lee A. Coppock, David Debold, Lucian E. Dervan, James E. Felman, Drew Findling, Roberta Flowers, Ian N. Friedman, Lee Fugate, Helen Gredd, Lawrence S. Goldman, John Wesley Hall, Jr., John F.  Lauro, Bruce Lyons, Terrance MacCarthy, Edward A. Mallett, Bruce Maloy, Eric R. Matheney, Michael D. Monico, Jane W. Moscowitz, Marc L. Mukasey, Kevin J. Napper, Julie Nielsen, Cynthia Eva Orr, J. Edward Page, Marjorie J. Peerce, Patricia A. Pileggi, Ellen S. Podgor, Gregory Poe, Mark P.   Rankin, Shana-Tara Regon, Kerri L. Ruttenberg, Brian Sanvidge, Melinda Sarafa, Fritz Scheller, Adam P. Schwartz, George Ellis Summers, Brian L. Tannebaum, Kevin Tate, Larry Thompson, Gary R.Trombley, Morris (Sandy) Weinberg, Jr., Solomon L. Wisenberg

 The opening keynote was given by Cynthia Orr, with Larry Thompson speaking about things not to do in a white collar case.  The 2015 White Collar Award went to Hank Asbill of Jones Day (see here).

(esp)

March 17, 2015 in About This Blog, Defense Counsel, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, March 8, 2015

"Should the Medium Affect the Message? Legal and Ethical Implications of Prosecutors Reading Inmate-Attorney Email"

New Student Note - Brandon P. Ruben (Fordham) - here

Abstract:     

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential legal communications between a party and her attorney from being used against her, thus encouraging full and frank attorney-client communication. It is a venerable evidentiary principle of American jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly, prosecutors may not eavesdrop on inmate-attorney visits or phone calls or read inmate-attorney postal mail. Courts are currently divided, however, as to whether or not they can forbid prosecutors from reading inmate-attorney email. This Note explores the cases that address whether federal prosecutors may read inmates’ legal email. As courts have unanimously held, because inmates know that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) monitors all their email, their legal email is unprivileged. In addition, all courts have rejected the argument that prosecutors reading inmates’ legal email impermissibly restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. Accordingly, despite questioning the practice’s propriety, four courts have ruled that there is no legal basis to prevent prosecutors from reading inmate-attorney email. Two courts, however, pursuant to no clear authority, prevented the prosecutors from doing so. This Note argues that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmate- attorney email as a matter of self-regulation because this behavior unjustifiably chills inmate-attorney communication. In addition, this Note asserts that BOP’s email monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel, a challenge prisoners’ rights advocates have yet to bring. In cases where BOP’s email monitoring policy is not at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a constitutional decision, this Note concludes that courts should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by exercising their delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, courts should invoke Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 
(esp)

March 8, 2015 in Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

More on Yates: Fish and Overcriminalization

Co-blogger Solomon Wisenberg's post on today's Supreme Court decision in Yates v. United States highlights the plurality opinion that focuses on a straight statutory interpretation analysis.  But there is an interesting and important note in the dissent that is worth mentioning.

In Part III of the dissent it states, "That brings to the surface the real issue: overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code."  -  So even though the dissenters are not willing to toss out the statute with the fish, they are recognizing the overcriminalization movement.

Second, the dissenters state - ". . . , I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that s 1519 is a bad law -- too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And I'd go further:  In those ways s 1519 is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code."

The recognition by these dissenting justices of the growing problem of overcriminalization in the United States is an important step. In many ways this decision is really a 9-0 decision in that the plurality tossed the fish case out because it did not fit in this sea.  The dissenters felt their hands were tied to allow the fish case to stay, but they weren't happy with what Congress was doing and sent their message in the sentences above.  Will Congress listen, that is the important question here.

(esp)

February 25, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Obstruction | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

You Must Remember This. A Fish Is Just A Fish.

The U.S. Supreme Court has rendered its opinion in Yates v. United States. A fish is still a fish, but it is not a tangible object under 18 U.S.C. Section 1519, which was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Under Section 1519:

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers-up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object, with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under Title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.

Yates was charged under 1519 with destroying, concealing, and covering-up some undersized groupers which he threw overboard after they were segregated and ordered preserved by Officer John Jones of the National Marines Fisheries Service.

The Court ruled 5-4 that Yates' conduct did not run afoul (or a fish) of 1519, because the little fishies were not tangible objects under that particular statute which was clearly aimed, as an examination of its title and overall language shows, at document-related cover-ups. Justice Ginsburg, writing the Opinion of the Court for a four person plurality, held that a tangible object under 1519 is really only a tangible object "used to record or preserve information." She was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment alone, but used a textual-contextual approach similar to that employed by the plurality, stating that a tangible object under 1519 had to be "something similar to records or documents." Always careful not to offend the federal prosecutorial apparatus, Alito called it a very close case.

In dissent Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, used a straight textual approach and pointed to the plain and ordinary meaning of tangible object--an object that is touchable. You can touch a fish. Ergo, a fish is a tangible object. You can destroy, cover-up, or conceal a fish. By doing so with the right amount of intent, you can violate 1519. End of story.

(wisenberg)

February 25, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

The Kroll Report on UT-Austin and the Limits of Internal Investigations

Any internal white collar invesitgation is limited by the nature and scope of the investigation and the power of the entity conducting it. And those are just the tangible, objective limiting factors. Are you reporting to the Audit Committee or directly to the Board? Does your law firm (or audit firm or private investigation firm) have other business, or seek further business, with the company or governmental unit that has ordered the investigation? Are subtle signals being sent your way?

Last week the University of Texas System released the Kroll Final Report on Admissions Practices and Allegations of Undue Influence at University of Texas at Austin. The Kroll Report was commissioned by the Chancellor and Vice Chanchellor of the U.T. System after a former U.T.-Austin Admissions Office official came forward alleging that the office of U.T.-Austin President William Powers had "at times exerted pressure on the [Admissions Office] to admit some applicants of lesser qualifications in response to external influences." This official came forward after an earlier, strictly internal, investigation was completed, with its attendant report released to the public. The earlier investigation included interviews of Powers and his top assistant.

As I wrote here last June, this is all part of a long-running battle between former U.T. System Regent Wallace Hall (plus some of his colleagues) and President Powers. Hall started snooping around, which is actually his duty as a Regent, and found several things that troubled him, including:

Admission of students to the University of Texas School of Law who had LSAT scores below the average for entering U.T. Freshlaws. Some of the admitted students were related or connected to powerful state legislators with key roles in funding the university and law school.

 

That last revelation was apparently too much for the legislature (or "the leg" as we called it in my day) and impeachment hearings were commenced by the House Select Committee on Transparency in State Agency Operations ("Transparency Committee").

 

As I said, the controversy has had its comic moments. The Transparency Committee voted to recommend impeachment of Hall before deigning to draft any Articles of Impeachment. And Transparency Committee Co-Chair Dan Flynn wrote a public letter stating that: 1) there were insufficient grounds to impeach Hall; 2) Hall should resign anyway; and 3) Hall should be impeached if he did not resign. When Hall refused to resign, Flynn voted to impeach him. (The Texas Tribune has a good story here on Flynn's remarkable letter and the response he received from Representative Eric Johnson. Both letters are attached to the story in PDF format.)

 

The fight between Hall and the legislature is apparently part of a larger years-long battle between th Board of Regents and UT President Bill Powers. The Regents have Governor Perry and company on their side and Powers has legislative allies on his. I'm not concerned about that. I have reviewed Hall's purportedly impeachable offenses and find the allegations against him unpersuasive, but I would not be writing about these things on a white collar blog if impeachment hearings were the only thing going on. Unfortunately, there's more.

 

The Transparency Committee's Co-Chairs also referred Hall to the Travis County District Attorney's Public Integrity Unit, which has opened an investigation into possible criminal wrongdoing by Hall. This is the same office that brought dubious charges against former U.S. House Speaker Tom DeLay and has a long history of questionable public corruption prosecutions. The Public Integrity Unit is an odd creature of Texas law, housed in the Travis County DA's Office with statewide jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute state officials. The old Travis County DA was Ronnie Earle. The current Travis County DA is Rosemary Lehmberg, an Earle disciple, who refused to resign from office after pleading guilty to Driving While Intoxicated.

The Kroll Report found no violation of law, but did not, and apparently was not asked to, consider any state or federal criminal laws.

The Kroll Report found no proof of a quid pro quo, but did not directly investigate, and with few exceptions did not question, individuals who did not work within the university system.

The Kroll Report found no lies by President Powers when he was questioned as part of the earlier inquiry, noting that he "answered specific questions with technical precision." But Kroll also found that Powers, through material omissions, apparently misled that inquiry, and that Powers "failed to speak with the candor and forthrightness" expected of someone in his position "of trust and leadership."

A Wall Street Journal editorial on the Kroll Report characterizes it as a vindication of Wallace Hall and calls for an "end to the campaign to punish Mr. Hall." But the Journal speaks only of Hall's censure by the legislature and the effort to impeach him, never mentioning the still active criminal investigation hanging over Hall's head.

Holding a press conference after the Kroll Report was issued, Powers called the Report "thorough, accurate and fair" and said that he thinks it clears him. Powers, however, denied being evasive in his answers to the earlier inquiry, noting that the lawyers conducting that inquiry had stressed its limited nature. Powers, after initially refusing to discuss individual regents or donors, also claimed that Hall himself "has exerted influence over the admissions process." But Powers declined to comment on whether the Report exonerated Hall, noting that "there is an investigation going on about his conduct." I find Powers' statement quite chilling. It serves as a reminder that this is Texas and Hall is not out of the woods.

(wisenberg)

February 17, 2015 in Investigations | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, February 2, 2015

Judge Rakoff and Professor Garrett on Deferred Prosecution Agreements

Judge Rakoff has authored an interesting article in the New York Review of Books examining Professor Brandon L. Garrett’s book entitled “Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations.”  Professor Garrett’s book looks closely at the use of deferred prosecution agreements by the government and includes a wealth of information and data.  While Professor Garrett concludes that deferred prosecution agreements have been “ineffective,” he also proposes a number of steps that might make them more efficient in the future.  Along with conducting a nice discussion of Professor Garrett’s book, Judge Rakoff offers his own perspective on these agreements in his review.  For those interested in deferred prosecution agreements, both Judge Rakoff’s article and Professor Garrett’s book are must reads.

(LED)

February 2, 2015 in Books, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Scholarship, Sentencing, Settlement | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

More Information Regarding the Proposed Amendments to the Fraud Guidelines

There has been much talk recently regarding Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, commonly referred to as the Fraud Guidelines.  Earlier this year, I noted in a post that the American Bar Association had issued a report calling on the Sentencing Commission to revise Section 2B1.1.  Specifically, this report contained a number of suggestions regarding loss calculations and the impact of the current loss table.  Earlier this month, Ellen Podgor posted regarding the release of the Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary), which included proposed amendments to Section 2B1.1.

As readers begin to digest the proposed amendments from the Sentencing Commission and the Commission’s determination that they “have not seen a basis for finding the guideline to be broken for most forms of fraud…,” I wanted to provide a link to some additional information.  The first is a video presentation by Commission staff regarding a detailed examination of economic crime data.  The presentation was given at a January 9, 2015 public meeting and offers some extremely interesting analysis of data collected regarding sentencing under Section 2B1.1.  The second is a copy of the PowerPoint presentation from the January 9, 2015 presentation.  In particular, I direct readers to Figure 1, showing the growth in below range sentences since 2003, and Figure 5, showing the number of cases within range decreasing sharply as the loss figure in the case grows.  For those who enjoy statistics, there is a wealth of information for consideration in these materials.

(LED)

January 28, 2015 in Fraud, Government Reports, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, January 26, 2015

Collateral Consequences and Ray Rice

   Earlier this month, my colleague Lucien E. Dervan highlighted the issue of collateral consequences as one of the criminal justice hot topics of the year  ("Collateral Consequences in 2015, "  Jan. 7,2015).   Prof. Dervan mentioned the work of both the ABA and the NACDL, specifically the NACDL report "Collateral Damage: America's Failure to Forgive or Forget in the War on Crime."   I was a member of the NACDL task force which held hearings in six cities and wrote the report.

    Collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, or even an arrest, often dwarf the actual punishment meted out by the judge presiding over the case.  Such consequences include, but are far from limited to, serious immigation consequences, denial of fair consideration for employment, inability to secure professional and other licenses, ineligibility for government  housing and education aid,  denial of the right to vote, serve as a juror, or hold office, and the inability to possess weapons. 

   Broadly speaking, there are two types of collateral consequences - mandatory and discretionary. The NACDL report recommends that mandatory collateral consequences be disfavored and only occur when substantially justified for public safety reasons by the specific underlying criminal conduct.  Discretionary collateral consequences should be imposed only when the offense conduct is directly related to the benefit or opportunity sought.  "Benefits and opportunities should never be denied based upon a criminal record that did not result in a conviction."

   The indefinite suspension of Baltimore Ravens halfback Ray Rice by NFL commissioner Roger Goodell for punching and knocking down his then girl friend (now wife) went against the grain of these salutory recommendations. Rice's actions, however deplorable, did not affect his ability to carry a football. Rice posed no more or less a threat to his fellow players, or anyone else, after his arrest than before. Additionally, Rice was never convicted of any crime; his case was diverted and eventually dismissed.  (Here, the criminal justice system perhaps treated him too gently; organized football treated him too harshly). And his suspension by the commissioner was justifiably overturned by an impartial arbitrator, former federal judge Barbara Jones,  although not (at least explicitly) for the reasons discussed above.

  To be sure, Rice's employer, the Ravens' owner, who cut him shortly after the revelation of the incident, might have, arguably reasonably,  made a determination that his presence on the team would have led to decreased attendance (although the football fans I know would likely not have been been deterred) or revenues or bad public relations.  Even so, some other owner should have had the opportunity to hire Rice to bolster his team's backfield and give him an opportunity to earn a living.  When Michael Vick, after a felony conviction and prison sentence for animal abuse, returned to the Philadelphia Eagles, he made the team better - and his rehiring was praised by President Obama.

  Collateral consequences should not be imposed unless the acts for which an individual has been convicted make it at least more likely than otherwise that he would pose a safety risk to those for whom he works or others with whom he is in contact.  That salutary policy should cover all crimes -- including murder,  sex crimes, animal abuse - and domestic violence.

(goldman)

   

 

 

 

 

January 26, 2015 in Celebrities, Current Affairs, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)